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This project is a comparative case study of the lives of the late Iranian General, Qassem 
Soleimani and former president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The 
study is intended to reveal multiple similarities between these two historic figures 
through the scope of prominent political philosophy derived from the works of Plato and 
Machiavelli. Not only will it be identified that both men were devoted to a lifestyle of 
continuous study of military matters, a practice championed by Machiavelli’s 
conceptualization of the perfect prince, but their characters served as exhibitions of 
Plato’s "timocratic" man. However, near the end of their pre-political careers, only 
Ataturk was able to ascend to a position of political authority while Soleimani suffered an 
unprecedented assassination. The goal of this project is to demonstrate support for the 
argument that Machiavelli’s prescriptions for constant militant vigilance promotes a 
sense of paranoia that hinders the pursuit of peripheral ambitions within a militant career. 
Thus, while Soleimani followed a primarily Machiavellian path to leadership, Ataturk, by 
virtue of his use of Platonic principles at the outset of his military career, became the 




paradigms established by fundamental frameworks of political philosophy to 
contemporary figures of power, this study will not only demonstrate the manners in 
which the theories of these very different philosophers can work in conjunction with one 
another, but it will also provide an examination of how well the principles inspiring Plato 
and Machiavelli’s ideas withstand the challenges associated with modern security threats. 
This study will draw evidence from the works of Plato & Machiavelli to provide a 
substantial theoretical background for this analysis and will also focus upon biographical 









Ataturk vs. Soleimani: Political Philosophy and Contemporary Archetypes 
Rachel R. Tolhurst 
 
This thesis is an examination of the lives of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk through the lens of the political philosophies of Plato and Niccolò 
Machiavelli. Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were noted for their militant 
lives and share certain qualities of character in their pre-political careers that provide a 
unique opportunity for a direct comparison and the formulation of a normative claim 
assessing their relative successes and/or failures despite their many similarities. Through 
the course of this research the conclusion asserts that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was a more 
capable man than Soleimani to ascend to a position of political power specifically due to 
his prioritization of Platonic principles from an early age which guided his pre-political 
career. Soleimani, on the other hand, pursued a militant path more consistent with the 
values of a Machiavellian prince and was therefore faced with a greater degree of 
difficulty in attempting to transition to political life. The theories of Plato and 
Machiavelli each propose strategies for moving toward an ideal state of governance but 
apply very different methods for achieving it. While Plato values the pursuit and 
inclusion of reason and enlightenment for all leaders, Machiavelli assigns more 
importance the object of power regardless of societal consciousness. Plato’s most realistic 
model of a leader that is not the famed philosopher king, is the timocratic man, largely 
militant but not a stranger to the pursuit of reason. Machiavelli’s model is a militant 
expert with a mastery of cunning and possibly duplicitous management of personal 
affairs. Ataturk more closely resembles the timocratic man than Soleimani in his early 
dedication to the goal of broad societal education and altruistic notions of political 
reform. Soleimani’s life was more characterized by militancy and the elements of conflict 
and deception that arise in Machiavelli’s model of leadership. As a result, Ataturk was 
more prepared to face the challenges of the political sphere and Soleimani was left 
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 The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani in January of 2020 signified, for 
Iran, the loss of not only a major defender of Iranian dominance and sovereignty, but a 
man who symbolized the Shia values that underpinned the society’s broader collective 
identity.1 Following the fatal United States drone strike that claimed Qassem Soleimani’s 
life, the world at large recoiled in shock and began to prepare themselves for the long 
years of conflict which would surely ensue due to this extrajudicial, targeted killing.2 
Subsequent studies and remembrances of his life, however, have each taken note of the 
extensive depths of Soleimani’s militant lifestyle and have even gone so far as to label his 
methods as “Machiavellian” .3 Assigning distinct philosophical frameworks derived from 
historic political thinkers instantly contextualizes political behavior within the bounds of 
an established academic framework of interpretation. Such terminological depictions are 
accompanied by the associated traits with which they were contrived and therefore 
communicate a large breadth of information within the confines of a single word. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the promulgation of reductive understandings of prominent 
political theories, developing studies which clarify the inner workings of such concepts is 
an imperative step in identifying why this terminology is still relevant and important to 
this day. Modern studies of leadership are largely reflective of the standards of 
contemporary societies, however the regular application of historic political theory in 
examining leaders in the modern day demonstrates that these paradigms remain central in 
 
1 Aslan, Reza. 2009. Beyond Fundamentalism: Confronting Religious Extremism in the Age of 
Globalization. Random House Inc. 
2 Osnos, Adam Entous and Evan. 2020. "Last Man Standing." New Yorker, February 10: 40-51. 
3 Weiss, Michael. 2019. "Iran's Qasem Soleimani is the Mastermind Preparing Proxy Armies for War with 





conceptualizing our ideas on differing leadership styles and categorically defining the 
traits that are often present within these heavily theoretical frameworks. 
This study directly explores the impacts of applying the leadership paradigms of 
Machiavelli and Plato to the pre-political behaviors of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, two major militant figures in Middle Eastern history whose comparative 
legacies reveal stimulating insights on modern leadership. In formulating a normative 
claim concerning the relative efficacy of Qassem Soleimani’s style of leadership as 
compared to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s, this research identifies that after applying the 
frameworks for effective leadership from the theories of Plato and Machiavelli, Ataturk 
was the better equipped man to transition from a militant lifestyle to a politically based 
career. Being a closer example of Platonic ideals than Soleimani, Ataturk, known for 
consistently exhibiting state-minded ambition for the betterment of the Turkish nation, 
was ultimately better prepared to engage with the challenging territory of political life. 
Alternatively, Soleimani, a militant expert and a true testament to Machiavelli’s 
transcendent student of warfare and opportunity, did not possess an equivalent interest in 
broad reformation or educational and political efforts, and subsequently found the 
transition into the political sphere a much more difficult path to tread.  The major 
conclusions of this research clarify the many distinctions between Machiavelli’s concept 
of an ideal leadership figure and Plato’s, arguably, most realistic model of practical 
headship, the timocratic man. In retroactively comparing the leadership initiatives of two 
very similar subjects, this research uses Machiavelli and Plato’s philosophical 
frameworks to assign meaning to these distinctions in a manner that produces significant 





that Ataturk’s early interest in political change and community-wide improvement are 
indicative of several major Platonic principles championing state-minded selflessness and 
reason-based thinking which directly aided him in reaching his ultimate goal of a political 
career. Alternatively, Soleimani’s primarily Machiavellian career path, shrouded in a 
constant state of warfare with little thought toward a political future, left him vulnerable 
and somewhat unprepared for the volatility of the political realm. Thus, Machiavellian 
efficiency with respect to militant vigilance, is perhaps best wielded in conjunction with 
Platonic principles which propel the broad cultivation of society-wide progress in the 
pursuit of higher reason. 
Question 
What characteristics are exemplified by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani 
that are consistent with the standards of Plato’s prescriptions for effective leadership as 
opposed to Machiavelli’s?       
The process of applying fundamental political theories to the observable 
behaviors of globally surveilled authority figures offers researchers the chance to test 
these theories for their ongoing relevance and to draw conclusions based upon the 
inferences that accompany the theoretical material. This project initially examines the 
work of Plato and Machiavelli separately to identify the relevant attributes that are 
present in the study subjects, Soleimani and Ataturk. The research discusses the theorists’ 
perspectives on the utility and definitions of both ambition and leadership. It posits that 
Plato’s version of realistic leadership re-centers personal ambition to include state -
minded selflessness, while Machiavelli’s advocates for the internalization of ambition to 





to adapt to the realities of the fluctuating political world. Plato and Machiavelli’s theories 
are then examined together, identifying that while both Soleimani and Ataturk satisfy 
Machiavelli’s standards by way of constant military study, Ataturk more completely 
fulfills the category of Plato’s timocratic man. Analyzing these concepts in tandem 
reveals several possible explanations behind the very different demises of these 
astonishingly similar men. 
 This study was conducted in full knowledge of several assumptions which could 
have potentially influenced the resulting conclusions. Firstly, the death of Qassem 
Soleimani came at the hands of a foreign adversary and was violent in nature while 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk died of natural causes long after his military career had come to 
an end.4 This research assumes that Soleimani’s assassination, although admittedly 
originating from an unprecedented5 and impulsive political decision, could signify some 
degree of failure in terms of Soleimani’s pre-political career as compared to Ataturk. 
However, this research will demonstrate that the argument positing that Ataturk had long 
possessed a greater capability than did Soleimani to ascend to a political career, 
originates from an in-depth analysis of political theory and considers the assassination to 
be a side effect rather than the reason for Soleimani’s relative relegation for the purpose 
of this study. Indeed, the focus of the biographical examinations is restricted to the pre-
political careers of each man to eliminate any bias based on the assassination event itself. 
Isolating the pre-political experiences of Soleimani and Ataturk is an effective method for 
drawing direct comparisons between the circumstances contributing to their character 
 
4 Mango, Andrew. 1999. Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey. The Overlook Press. 
Pg. 525. 





development as well as the nature of their extensive military occupations that preceded 
substantial political engagement. Secondly, this research assumes that the burden of proof 
which must be fulfilled to draw conclusions based upon the political theories of Plato and 
Machiavelli, is a sufficient analysis of the referenced components such that the anecdotal 
evidence is largely consistent with the nuances of the timocratic character and prescribed 
continuance of military study. From this analysis this research provides normative 
contentions in support of the argument that while both men were largely timocratic 
archetypes and consistent students of war for the duration of their pre-political careers, 
the differing utility and theoretical definitions of personal ambition appropriately serve as 
sufficient grounds to determine the concluding suppositions of this research. 
 The following sections of this project paper will begin with a review of the 
existing literature surrounding the subject of modern leadership analysis and describe the 
ways in which this research project departs from the prevailing academic narrative. 
Secondly, the paper will include a discussion of theory, offering explanations deciphering 
specific theoretical elements that serve as comparative tools supporting the research 
contentions. Subsequently, the paper includes a description of the case studies in the form 
of a detailed biographical account of Qassem Soleimani followed by that of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk with particular emphasis on each subject’s pre-political career. The next 
section contains a discussion of the central normative contentions, utilizing theory and 
examples from each case study to compose a structured argument and draw conclusions 
about the research. Finally, the essay concludes with a summary of the findings and a 







Modern research concerning leadership deals largely with issues of interpersonal 
communication and conflict resolution. Any setting within the confines of a hierarchical 
system is bound to have its difficulties. However, contemporary research concerning 
leadership styles and initiatives demonstrates the ways in which leaders are not only 
expected to behave under specific pressures but further promotes the growth of 
discussions surrounding the standards of contemporary societies and why emphasis on 
examining leadership matters. The breadth of modern research relating to leadership not 
only identifies the many ways in which average individuals are able to take initiative in a 
leadership role but also establishes the importance of leadership as a fundamental 
structure for establishing order and maintaining efficiency. The following sections 
contain broader descriptions of such research as well as a discussion of the use of 
political philosophy in evaluating leadership styles.  
Existing research on the issue of leadership deals largely with communication and 
human-oriented decision making. A study published in the Journal of Business and 
Psychology in 2010 demonstrates how differing methods of communication between 
leaders their subordinates produce varying results in production outcomes and lends 
credence to arguments demonstrating that leaders possessing decisiveness and an aptitude 
for supportive and precise language are more capable of eliciting a positive and efficient 
work atmosphere.6 The study’s major implications are offered as reference material for 
the purpose of future training exercises for leadership roles in various settings, indicating 
 
6 Reinout De Vries, Angelique Bakker-Pieper, and Wyneke Oostenveld. 2010. "Leadership = 
Communication? The Relations of Leaders' Communication Styles with Leadership Styles, Knowledge 





that modern studies on leadership initiatives regard leadership as something to aspire to 
and continually improve upon rather than something that comes as a natural ability. 
Another major area of focus is the subject of conflict management. An examination of 
this dynamic conducted by Sameer Limbare in 2012 identifies that individual leader’s 
methods of conflict management are often directly linked to their style of leadership.7 
This directly impacts the relationships within authority structures and can reveal traceable 
outcomes of specific conflict management behaviors. This study was intended to indicate 
the most effective ways of dissolving internal disputes in a manner that improves the 
major professional mechanism but also helps leadership figures to adapt their modes of 
resolving disagreements to increase functionality and cohesiveness. While both of these 
major themes in modern research of leadership allow for the application of common 
principles of ideal leadership styles, the inclusion of political philosophy in support of the 
quantitative methodologies of studies such as these would provide additional leverage for 
researchers hoping to convey a meaningful precedent for the significance of leadership as 
a subject of study. Political philosophy stemming from historic leadership structures that 
still affect us today lends valuable insight to the inferences that are made with respect to 
such hierarchies and the principles they represent. 
There are also multiple perspectives regarding the utility of political philosophy in 
the context of evaluating modern leadership initiatives. The value of Machiavellian 
notions is predominantly referenced as advocating selfish deviousness in his prescriptions 
for effective leadership under the burdens associated with unilateral authority.8 Although 
 
7 Limbare, Sameer. 2012. "Leadership Styles & Conflict Management Styles of Executives." Indian 
Journal of Industrial Relations 172-180. 
8 Caron, J. 2019. The Prince 2.0: Applying Machiavellian Strategy to Contemporary Political Life. 





Machiavelli’s work is credited by some scholars for reconstructing the bases of 
fundamental political thought at the time, others contend that Machiavelli’s goal in 
writing The Prince was to apply these concepts within the context of observable history9 
rather than to discredit political philosophies already in existence. Machiavelli’s theories 
depart from the traditional structure of Roman civil science as a technique for political 
study and instead utilize evidenced behavior of political figures to construct new 
interpretations and postulate explanations based upon the primary foundations of a secure 
civil society.10 Machiavelli’s work demonstrates the value of preserving a society in 
which law and order can be rapidly restored and upheld, and advocates for closer 
examination of political action as indicative components of human behavior. 
Machiavelli’s arguments are largely empirical observations of recorded history and 
calculated human choices.11 Concepts originating from moral tenets such as 
Machiavellian virtue12 and ethics have been largely swathed in prima facie conversations 
that restrict the scope of psychosomatic reactions to political challenges in a world of 
ever-evolving social issues.  
The broader discussion of Machiavelli’s major contributions contends that 
Machiavelli is largely motivated by realism without regard for sentimentality in his hopes 
for peace in Italy.  However, some scholars have taken extra care to examine his 
theoretical derivations and possible inspirations that deviate from popular assumptions. 
One such perspective comes from the writing of Isaah Berlin who argued that 
 
9  Viroli, Maurizio. 2004. Machiavelli. New York: Oxford University Press. 
10 Ibid. Viroli. Pg. 117.  
11 Ibid. Viroli. Pg. 123.  
12 Molchanoy, Mikhail A. 2016. The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership. United 





Machiavelli’s prince is not amoral after all, but rather an ode to the tenets of moral values 
in ancient Greece as opposed to modern notions of morality.13 Thus, for Machiavelli’s 
purposes, the wellbeing and glory of the state is placed in higher regard than matters of 
individual virtue. This indicates that Machiavelli’s princes need not worry about their 
personal salvation so long as their efforts toward the preservation of the state are in 
earnest. Another famous account of Machiavelli’s motivations comes from Baruch 
Spinoza14 who asserts that Machiavelli’s work was not meant as a directive manual but 
rather as a warning intended to reveal to the citizens the ways in which leaders have and 
can continue to take advantage of the society for their own personal gain. These 
conclusions are drawn largely from the fact that Niccolò Machiavelli wrote The Prince 
while in exile, and thus suggests that this work is intended to serve as a scathing critique 
of how the state truly operated. Nevertheless, this project’s rendering of Machiavelli’s 
philosophy subsidizes existing academia by demonstrating how the application of 
philosophical principles in the face of contemporary security concerns may allow for the 
evolution of these theories. Furthermore, such analysis may help to produce actionable 
intelligence and useful forecasts concerning the political behaviors of other non-
democratic leaders.  
Platonic exploration is conceivably the most prevalent when seeking observations 
concerning exhibitions of wisdom and virtue amongst rulers in modern history. The key 
narrative encompassing Plato’s contributions to these discussions is couched in his 
depiction of the philosopher king whose mastery of inner equilibrium and wisdom make 
 
13 Berlin, Isaah. 2013. "The Originality of Machiavelli." In Against the Current: Essays in the History of 
Ideas, 33-100. Princeton University Press. 
14 Steinberg, Justin. 2008. "Spinoza's Political Philosophy." In Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited 





him the ideal leader to bring about harmony and profound development in civil 
societies.15 Plato’s representation of the republic illuminates the indispensable functions 
of cohesive societal components such that justice is ultimately demarcated as a condition 
in which both the society and the individual governing it has attained equilibrium 
between instinctive, primal urges and the will to pursue reason and enlightenment16 
primarily for the purpose of aiding the growth of a society unless its leader is a conduit 
for the completely pure, untainted, and unabated knowledge of the good.17 Another 
approach to research applying Plato’s leadership paradigms to modern leadership 
dilemmas is by dissecting the epistemological roots of Plato’s major ideas. One study 
published in 1998 examines the foundations of Plato’s ethical arguments identifying the 
primacy of self-sufficiency and moral reasoning as central but not independently 
sufficient attributes that assist a good leader.18 It concludes that a managerial viewpoint 
on matters of organization and justice in tandem with charisma and transparency each 
have something invaluable to contribute to evolving modes of leadership behavior with 
respect to the ethical codes that define modern societies and restrict certain activities such 
as reality distortion and tyranny.  
Another major discussion dissecting the finer points of Plato’s dialectic is the 
subject of the role of military figures in civil societies. The research of G. R. Lucas opens 
a discussion surrounding the appropriate subject and functions of the guardians and 
warriors in the ideal state, clarifying that “The role of the modern warrior is the never-
ending struggle against the abuse of power by tyrants and criminals and the protection of 
 
15 Bloom, Allan. 1968. The Republic of Plato. Basic Books LLC. 
16 Miller, David. 2017. "Justice". University of Stanford. 
17 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 221-250. 





the vulnerable rights and liberties of their prospective victims. Warriors, as distinct from 
tyrants and criminals, use force reluctantly, and only when necessary, for this sole 
purpose: to protect the well-being of others, and never simply to harm them”.19 His work 
pulls from a discussion of higher moral callings in the pursuit of justice and proposes that 
these principles are often overlooked in modern research. This research project departs 
from such studies and draws analytical support from Plato’s predeterminations of the 
timocratic20 man in tandem with the moral values associated with Platonic principles to 
provide explanations for political actions and to further assess this framework in the 
context of security challenges that had yet to exist at the time of this theory’s conception. 
Furthermore, this research is similarly examined through the lens of Machiavelli’s 
notions of militant responsibility and appropriate methods of societal engagement. 
This project provides supplementary comprehension to current political research 
on the applications of historic philosophy by presenting several consistencies in the 
characteristics of non-democratic leaders that generate useful inferences and could 
promote the development of forecasting matrixes for political actors in like 
administrations. If it is observed in the case studies that the conditions described by Plato 
in the creation of the timocratic man are applicable to the origins of either or both 
Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, it will then be concluded that the 
decisions made by each subject were likely partially inspired by the principles of Plato’s 
timocratic theory. If it is observed that in conjunction with the elements of Plato’s 
timocratic man, either or both subjects exhibit a pattern of regular engagement with 
 
19 Lucas, G. R. n.d. "Forgetful Warriors": Neglected Lessons on Leadership from Plato's Republic. 
Annapolis: Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership. U.S. Naval Academy. Pg. 14-18. 





Platonic concepts championing altruism, education, and state-minded reformative efforts, 
it will be concluded that the subject in question is largely consistent with the values of 
leadership most closely associated with Plato’s prescriptions for leadership. 
Alternatively, if either or both subjects display a departure from these notions in pursuit 
of personal achievement and duplicitous activities, the conclusion will reflect that the 
behavior of the subject in question is more consistent with a Machiavellian model of 
leadership. If one subject is found to reflect Platonic values and the other exemplifies 
Machiavelli’s prescriptions, it will then be concluded that this distinction is a major 
element in determining the overall effectiveness of the leadership styles that are described 







 The philosophies of Plato and Machiavelli in describing the attributes of 
competent and effective leaders each call for differing qualities of personal character with 
the common goal of reaching an ideal state. Machiavelli’s depiction of the perfect prince 
conjures imagery of a master tactician with an extraordinary sense of situational 
awareness and an unmatched ability to wield the best and worst aspects of human nature 
to manipulate his reality and secure his position of authority. Alternatively, Plato’s 
philosopher king is a man swathed in the pure intention of the pursuit and dissemination 
of truth in the face of the warped realities created by lesser ambitious men, tasked with 
applying this knowledge to faithfully guide civilization toward an elevated level of 
conscious equilibrium. While there are certain complementary elements from each 
philosopher, it is imperative to clarify the fundamental distinctions which separate the 
underlying connotations of these concepts. Firstly, Plato’s work includes a detailed 
description in descending order of the regime types and leadership styles that follow the 
decay of the ideal state beginning with the timocratic man, molded by the circumstances 
of his upbringing. Although this Platonic figure is not the ideal philosopher king, he is 
nevertheless still capable of accessing the components of his soul that are guided by 
reason and can therefore act in accordance with several Platonic principles despite being 
a largely militant figure by nature. Secondly, Machiavelli prescribes vigilant attention to 
the continual study of military strategy for leaders hoping to take and maintain control in 
their respective realms. This militant figure, however, departs from Plato’s timocratic 
model by virtue of its being a broadly accessible directive toward dominant sovereignty 





synopsis of the theory components which have been applied for the purpose of this 
research. 
Plato and the Timocratic Man  
The biographical study of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reveals 
striking similarities in the characteristics of each subject, namely their early subjection to 
governmental blunders, ascension to power from humble origins, and distinct proclivity 
for combative strategy. Plato’s depiction of the timocratic man illustrates the 
circumstances in which astutely militant figures can develop and provides analysis 
concerning the accompanying personal attributes that influences their behavior. Plato’s 
character profile of the timocratic man portrays a martial epitome whom, despite the 
contentiousness and natural ambition21 that accompanies his temperament, is an honor 
and victory seeking22 man, a remnant of the “Laconian regime”.23 Though he aims to 
serve a greater purpose, the timocratic man is “not single-minded towards virtue”24 and is 
apt to indulge in his vices more so than the archetype of the philosopher king. For Plato, 
Timocracy, termed as the government of honor, is a degradation of the ideal state in 
which the inequities which are bound to arise in any growing population create internal 
conflicts and forge characters of a different constitution than those in Plato’s ideal state 
under the philosopher king.25 As for the society itself, many cultural aspects of the 
previous governmental era would remain, however, “the fear of admitting philosophers to 
power”26 would result in a departure from the peaceful, reason-governed logos that once 
 
21 Jowett, Benjamin. 2021. The Republic. Monee, Illinois. Pg. 157. 
22 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 223. 
23 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 223. 
24 Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 160. 
25 Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 158. 





prevailed and instead lead to a convergence of passion-driven and warlike tendencies.27 
The timocratic man that develops from such societal origins is likely to witness the 
hardships of his father under the strain of ineffectual governance28, and observe the 
frustrations of his family29 and servants in witnessing his father’s ostensible submission 
to subjugation in the face of foolhardy governmental policies and ill treatment from his 
fellow men.30 It is only when he grows older and steps out into the broader world that his 
latent desire to escape the condition of being at another’s mercy comes to fruition. 
The timocratic man observes that the ambitious and appetitive behaviors of some 
produce more success and respect than the more subservient and rational principles 
championed by his father.31 He therefore places great stock in behaviors which bring him 
recognition and triumph and he embraces his personal aspirations often in pursuit of 
militant excellence and sustained wealth.32 Plato describes this timocratic figure as 
remarkably obedient to authority; “he is a lover of ruling and honor, not basing his claim 
to rule on speaking or anything of the sort, but on warlike deeds and everything 
connected with war”.33 The characters of timocratic men in Plato’s view, are largely the 
result of having placed priority upon physical and combative accomplishments whilst 
neglecting exercises in philosophical reason. “They weren’t educated by persuasion but 
by force - the result of neglect of the true Muse accompanied by arguments and 
philosophy while giving more distinguished honor to gymnastics than music”.34  
 
27 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 225. 
28 Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 160. 
29 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 227. 
30 Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 161. 
31 Ibid. Jowett. Pg. 161. 
32 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 225. 
33 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 227. 





Nevertheless, the timocratic man, in Plato’s mind, is still able to ascend to the portion of 
the soul that is midway between reason and desire, proving himself to be courageous if 
perhaps somewhat aggressive in achieving his goals.35 “He doesn’t have a bad man’s 
nature”36 and is not so far removed from Plato’s ideal as to be selfish and greedy like 
those dwelling within an oligarchy.37 The timocratic man is a realistic portrayal of an 
ambitious, physically inclined being whose aspirations surpass those of his predecessors 
and whose actions are guided by this desire to rise.  
Machiavelli and the Study of War 
In researching the lives of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani, there 
appears a shared ethical motto which guided their military careers and ensured their 
ascendency as prominent martial experts: consistent dedication to the study of military 
strategy. In the words of Norman Schwartzkopf, “the more you sweat in peace, the less 
you bleed in war”.38 Machiavelli emphasizes that an essential element of protecting and 
constructing a fearsome and respectable reputation as a leader is the continual study of 
military subjects. “A prince who is ignorant of military matters […] cannot be esteemed 
by his soldiers, nor have confidence in them. He ought, therefore, never to let his 
thoughts stray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practice it more than in 
war, which he can do in two ways: both by action and by study”.39 Machiavellian 
efficiency is largely measured through manifestations of militant success despite possible 
violations of ethical boundaries. However, more than simply making constant 
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demonstrations of military might, Machiavelli stressed that it is essential for leaders to 
make a habit of the ceaseless study of history and warfare such that the lessons thereof 
may assist him in forming pre-emptive battle strategies. He prescribes that even and 
perhaps most especially during periods of peace, leaders must be contemplative of 
potential threats and be actively developing tactics for defending his territory. “He must 
[…] learn the nature of the land. […] This knowledge is useful in two ways. In the first 
place, one learns to know one’s country, and can the better see how to defend it. Then by 
means of the knowledge and experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand 
any other that it may be necessary to venture on. […] From a knowledge of the country in 
one province, one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others”.40  
 The centrality of martial expertise was central to Machiavelli as an article of 
leadership. “A prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, not take 
anything else as his art but that of war […], for that is the only art which is of concern to 
one who commands. And it is of such virtue that not only does it maintain those who 
have been born princes but many times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that 
rank”.41 He cites the success of Francesco Sforza in becoming a duke due to possessing 
adequate arms to do so and clarifies that the condition of being unarmed makes a man 
contemptible and unlikely to inspire loyalty.42 Machiavelli also praises Philopoemen, 
prince of the Achaeans for ceaselessly pondering modes of war, noting that this continued 
cogitation prevented the occurrence of any situation which he could not overcome with 
his soldiers.43 The constant pursuit of military knowledge must therefore be conducted 
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through deeds and study. “Besides keeping his armies well-ordered and exercised, he 
should always be out hunting, and through this accustom the body to hardships, and 
meanwhile he should learn the nature of the sites. [In this fashion] one learns to know 
one’s own country, and one can better understand its defense”.44 As for mental 
engagement, Machiavelli insists upon intensive reflection of historic battles and the 
emulation45 of great men whose wartime victories brought them long-term success. 
Remaining in continual observance of history and actively engaging with the nuances of 
battle strategy is, in Machiavelli’s view, a surefire method of making oneself prepared to 
face the challenges of changing fortunes and external dangers. 
The value of having access to two distinct martial profiles from Plato and 
Machiavelli depicting an idealistic military figure is found in a broader discussion of the 
motives behind their conception. The function of keeping Plato’s timocratic man separate 
from Machiavelli’s conceptualization of a vigilant military expert is a matter of 
distinguishing between one’s nature and the voluntary pursuit of power. The timocratic 
man is a figure whose roots from a struggling, subjugated family simply instills in him 
the desire to acquire general respect rather than an innate instinct for martial strategy. 
This, in Plato’s view, usually results in the timocratic man’s pursuit of athletic 
demonstrations of greatness such as military endeavors, but he is not violent by nature 
and his skills come only as a result of his engagement with physical modes of routine. 
Alternatively, Machiavelli’s recommendations for the ideal prince are composed as a 
manual for success regardless of the nature of the man in power. His depiction of a 
militant expert is simply a man who consciously engages with the strategies he outlines 
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as a matter of prudent choice. Indeed, one of Machiavelli’s goals in writing the prince 
was to demonstrate that nearly any figure of authority that was willing to commit to the 
prescribed regimen of study and adapt his instincts would be able to succeed and defend 
his sovereignty. Alternatively, Plato contends that a timocratic man could only arise from 
a very precise set of circumstances rendering this character far more unique. This 
distinction between the major theoretical tools being applied is essential in accurately 








The cases I have chosen to evaluate are the pre-political careers of Qassem Soleimani 
and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk; two prominent military figures hailing from non-democratic 
regimes in the Middle East, born into nations on the cusp of major political and social 
change. The specific development of revolutionary societal movements as a direct 
response to ineffectual governance in the early stages of both cases presents a similar 
narrative to the events that were occurring during the historical eras in which Machiavelli 
and Plato wrote their theories concerning leadership and authority. Machiavelli’s, The 
Prince, was partly inspired by his desire to see a martial hero like Lorenzo de ’Medici46 
rescue Italy from the hands of barbarous invaders that had long plagued its shores. Plato’s 
Republic was written in a time when Athens was experiencing multiple violent and 
abrupt governmental shifts that often cast the entire community into chaos.47 
Furthermore, these biographies reflect the two major philosophical elements being 
utilized in substantiation of the essay’s major claims, Plato’s classification of the 
timocratic man and Machiavelli’s prescribed vigilance in pursuit of militant wisdom. 
Both Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk exuded these qualities, but only one 
was able to successfully apply them for the purpose of transitioning from a military 
profession to a political career.  
Though the concepts of the timocratic man and Machiavelli’s perfect prince are used 
to identify the many similarities between both study subjects, these classifications 
represent two very different leadership methods. While the timocratic man is still a model 
of militant efficiency, he remains rooted to platonic concepts such as selflessness and 
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transparency for the good of those he leads. Machiavellian princes, on the other hand, 
embrace the use of duplicity and rely upon force rather than reason-based persuasion to 
guide their constituencies. Through the course of this study, it can be observed that both 
Soleimani and Ataturk were dedicated students of war and shared similar timocratic 
characteristics arising from like circumstances. However, overall, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
more fully embodied the breadth of Platonic principles than Soleimani, whose path more 
closely mirrors that of Machiavelli’s militant prince. This observation lends credence to 
the idea that leaders who more readily embrace concepts consistent with Platonic wisdom 
and ambition in their pre-political lives are better equipped to field the challenges 
associated with political careers. Alternatively, leaders that assign higher value to matters 
of warfare and conflict over matters of the mind and societal enlightenment have a higher 
degree of difficulty when faced with the realities of the political world. The next section 
is a summary profile of Iranian political development, followed by the biographical 
account of the Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. This will precede a summary profile of 
Turkish political development, and a subsequent biography of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
Iranian Political Development 
 The history of the Iranian nation is largely characterized by its ancient Persian 
roots; where “one of the world’s oldest nations, heir to a tradition that reaches back 
thousands of years, to periods when great conquerors extended their rule across 
continents, poets and artists created works of exquisite beauty, and one of the world’s 
most extraordinary religious traditions took root and flowered. Even in modern times, 





are passionately inspired by their heritage”.48 Modern political development in Iran is 
largely colored by the oil stalemate between 1951 and 1953 in which Iranian oil supplies 
were nationalized by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in response to rampant 
economic exploitation by its western partners.49 However, this decision ultimately 
resulted in an economic and governmental crisis and the Prime Minister was forcibly 
ousted from power at the behest of covert American action, and the Iranian Shah was 
restored to power, an appointment which would precipitate the beginnings of the Iranian 
Revolution.50 The era under Reza Shah Pahlavi is marked by oppression and widespread 
corruption, and the Shah’s overtly western orientation left the people and the clergy with 
the sense that secularism and western influences were distorting the sanctity of Iran’s 
Islamic identity.51 This discontentment was further exacerbated by an economic system 
which favored the middle classes but prevented further economic development and by the 
Shah’s harsh authoritarian retaliation against public criticism and dissention.52 This angst 
culminated in the 1979 Revolution in which the Shah fled Iran in defeat and the rule of 
Iran was transferred to the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini whose primary goal was to 
transform the Iranian nation to into a society governed by the central pillar of Shiite 
Islam.53 The Iranian nation, though religiously reformed, has since faced no shortage of 
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international conflicts; it was first challenged by the long Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s and 
has faced ceaseless conflicts since in the surrounding regions and internationally as its 
engagement in proxy warfare and pursuit of nuclear weapons54 inspire global terror. 
Qassem Soleimani 
Qassem Soleimani’s life is largely characterized by his singular adeptness for 
wielding his remarkable martial skills in exacting the will of the Iranian state with brutal 
efficiency. His lifestyle was reminiscent of his urban roots from which he developed an 
unparalleled knowledge of tribalistic conflict resolution and communication skills. 
Soleimani was widely revered for his complete and unrestrained devotion to his role as a 
wartime tactician and protector of Iran’s regional goals. For the Iranian people and the 
Ayatollahs under which he so faithfully served, he represented the very purpose of the 
1979 revolution. “Soleimani might not have been part of the urban social and intellectual 
elites, but he was exactly who the revolution had championed: the ordinary 
downtrodden”.55 He is remembered for possessing a fierce commitment to his position 
and is characterized as a man devoid of fear, often desiring to be directly engaged in the 
heart of combat amongst his fellow soldiers, truly a lion among men.56 These 
extraordinary characteristics are at least somewhat derived from the conditions in which 
Qassem Soleimani was raised in combination with his early fascination for the intricacies 
of physical combat that carried over into his military career. Indeed, military study would 
ultimately become the singular mode by which Soleimani lived his life, a true 
manifestation of Machiavelli’s ideal expert in matters of combat.  
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Likened to the timocratic man, so carefully described by Plato, Soleimani’s 
ambition is largely a product of his desire to rise above the circumstances of his own 
family, to surpass the accomplishments of his father such that he need not toil at the 
hands of those with the power to make his life difficult. “Qassem grew up with a father 
who had to live with debt and could not provide for his family the way he wanted”.57 
Hailing from a miniscule rural community in Qanat Molk, and on the outskirts of any 
influential Iranian circles, Soleimani was a member of the downtrodden who had suffered 
the consequences of multiple detrimental land reform attempts by the incompetent Shah 
during the White Revolution58 that took place in his youth.59 The Soleimani family was 
not only deprived of the lands so intently promised to them by Reza Shah, but the 
overwhelming debt they descended into due to this unfulfilled promise left them 
shrouded in a veil of shame.60 Despite their financial difficulties, Qassem worked 
construction-based jobs around the region in the summer months and he was able to 
complete his high school degree which would grant him access to a wide range of 
employment opportunities. By 1975, Qassem found an occupation which would take him 
far from his home and on to the next transformative phase of his young life in the city of 
Kerman.61  
As Soleimani experienced the vibrant cultural expanse that urban life had to offer, 
he stumbled upon the practice of martial arts which not only fascinated and enthralled 
him but would play a crucial role in distinguishing him as a superb physical combatant in 
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his early military career. “Kermani karate had found a most enthusiastic student and 
Qassem had found a pursuit that gave his life meaning, perhaps more than any other thing 
he had ever done”.62 Having worked for much of his life on construction sites that 
required demanding manual labor, Soleimani spent a great deal of time at local gyms and 
was the physical superior of many Kermani locals which only encouraged his interest in 
leading a highly athletic life.63 Not only did this allow him to pursue his keen interest in 
Iranian karate but he also bonded with boxers and other athletes that would eventually 
become his close military companions such as Ali Akbar Pooriani64, his future deputy. 
Timocratic in his obsession with physical demonstrations of power in exchange for 
recognition and respect, this marked the beginning of Soleimani’s continual study of 
militant strategy, as is required of Machiavelli’s perfect princes, and would ultimately 
signify a major departure from Platonic ideals and a convergence with the latter. 
However, the mid 1970’s in Iran would present an altogether new area of interest 
for Soleimani as a wave of revolutionary clerics began to gain popularity amongst the 
populace. As he wrestled with his role in this unfamiliar urban society, Soleimani began 
attending mosque services, “Qassem wasn’t particularly religious but where else would 
an ambitious young man who didn’t quite match with the Jack London-reading crowd 
fit”.65 He was particularly struck by Seyyed Reza Kamyab’s criticism of the Shah’s white 
revolution in 1977.66 “The rising economic difficulties of the country and an apparently 
wobbling shah had given the revolutionary movement a new lease on life. […] Qassem 
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Soleimani would later say: ‘My revolutionary struggles began when I heard a speech by 
Martyr Kamyab’”.67 By the end of 1978, tensions between the Shah and his people were 
at the point of no return after brutal crackdowns on clerical figures unleashed an 
irreversible torrent of outrage and radical efforts. “Now was the time to make history, to 
be part of something bigger than the tribe or the village, bigger than the world of karate 
even. Qassem had not helped make the revolution, but the revolution was sure to help 
make him”.68 Invigorated by the thrall of the changes to come and bolstered by a 
confidence in his own physical prowess, Soleimani’s dedication to military matters 
became all but a permanent fixture which would define the course of his life. 
Eager to aid to revolution, Soleimani seized his opportunity upon the emergence 
of the Iran-Iraq war. Following its genesis in 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) became the “most consequential militia in the history of the Middle 
East”69 and immediately began recruiting volunteer Muslims. Although Soleimani was 
initially rejected for the corps itself, he joined a local reserve corps connected to the 
IRGC but was soon granted his wish when the revolution fell under threat of a foreign 
enemy: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.70 The full Iraqi offensive began in September of 1980. 
“By attacking and occupying Iranian territory, Saddam Hussein had triggered forces 
beyond his imagination. The Iran-Iraq War became not the undoing of the Islamic 
Republic but a cauldron of fire in which the nascent republic consolidated itself and 
bolstered its rule. […] The fierce patriotism of Iranians had been awakened against a 
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foreign invader”.71 In 1981 Soleimani was one of three hundred Kermani soldiers sent to 
fight. His physical prowess, thanks to his martial arts background, was quickly detected 
by senior figures and less than one month after Saddam Hussein’s forces attacked Iran in 
1980, Soleimani was sent to coach physical education at the Quds Training Barracks72; 
the term “Quds” here signifying Jerusalem and the existential goal of reclaiming this holy 
ground from the Israelis. The training of physical ability as well as ideological attitudes 
was a key component in the shaping of the IRGC73 and would in due course play a major 
role in determining Soleimani’s fearsome reputation in the eyes of Israeli leadership and 
ensuring the respect and loyalty of his men. “He was physically strong and had this sense 
of determination that made him noticeable. […] He learnt how to say the right things 
about Islam and the revolution, but his focus was on the military matters”.74 
Soleimani’s physical prowess, commitment to the Quds force, and determination 
to push back Iran’s enemies helped him surge forward in his career at a young age and 
highlighted his ability to mobilize large groups of soldiers in the spirit of brotherhood and 
unity for the purpose of serving a higher cause. “The young commander spoke of love 
and God in his first real speech. The words of God asking for love and death were central 
to Soleimani’s [addresses]”.75 His ability to appeal to religious tenets in conjunction with 
heroic military attitudes was perhaps unparalleled and remained a key aspect of his 
rhetoric through the entire course of his life. Soleimani, being a member of the fray from 
his birth understood that one did not have to be an intellectual in Iran to speak the 
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universal language of Islamism that could be understood by all Iranians in an instant. 
This is the lightning rod which was utilized to rally warriors and encourage the sacrifice 
of life and limb from Iranian soldiers that made Soleimani such a decisively effective 
leader. His charisma and quiet sense of purpose gripped all those in his audience and his 
efforts in this regard inspired strength and national pride throughout the entire nation for 
the holy sacrifices that had been made for the sake of national security. “Thus, Soleimani 
gave hope to the soldiers while also initiating them into the world of martyrdom”.76 The 
idea that wartime goals were not simply for earthly gains but for elevating the reach of 
Islam into the world is not a new notion in the middle east, but Soleimani’s use of the 
concept of cosmic war77 was strikingly effective and bolstered his reputation in Iran as a 
defender of the nation as well as the faith. However, Soleimani’s application of religious 
tenets in motivating and directing his forces is reflective of a major Machiavellian 
stratagem in which leadership figures were advised to take advantage of religion78 to 
manipulate one’s followers and serve one’s own purposes. Though the invocation of 
religious terminology hearkens back to historic cultural practices in Middle Eastern 
warfare, Soleimani’s willingness to regularly wield this power to deadly effect indicates 
and alignment with Machiavelli’s standards in complete opposition to Platonic principles. 
After proving himself as a leader in the IRGC with the men in his charge being 
the most disciplined and responsive to military commands, Soleimani was given 
command over two battalions by the age of twenty five, jumpstarting his career and 
catapulting him into the spotlight where he spoke words of encouragement and faith to 
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thousands of soldiers at a time. In 1982 he accomplished successive battlefield victories 
at crucial locations beginning in the besieged city of Shush, aiding in turning the tide in 
Iran’s favor and prompting his commanding officers to grant Soleimani authority over his 
own independent IRGC brigade which was composed of thousands of soldiers.79 Hassan 
Bagheri, a gifted war tactician himself and Soleimani’s overseer, tasked Soleimani with 
the liberation of a contested area in the Ilam province of Iran in what would be called 
Operation Manifest Destiny80 which Soleimani would later come to call the “best 
operation of his life”.81 With his battalion whittled down to roughly a hundred men, 
Soleimani devised an ingenious ploy to trick the Iraqi forces and gain the advantage. 
They assembled a massive collection of vehicles with no fighters in them and set them on 
a path toward the Iraqis in the border village of Abu Gharib prompting the Iraqi forces to 
flee from their strongholds and cede the position. Soleimani remembered the incident 
with pride recounting that “despite the lack of weapons, we, the militants of Islam, had 
been able to take 3,000 Iraqis prisoner”.82 His legacy grew with each conquest and so did 
the impact of each triumph; “the Iraqis seemed to have little defense when faced with 
human waves of armies with revolutionary zeal, not least because these armies were 
fighting in the occupied territories of their own country”.83 Soleimani maintained a 
fearsome reputation throughout the duration of the Iran-Iraq War, a truly masterful 
tactician with a keen sense of military matters as a credit to his vigilant attention to the 
study of strategy and its applications in battle. 
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Soleimani’s devotedness to the cause of Ayatollah Khomeini was particularly 
apparent through the late 1980’s84 when Iran was truly alone in battling its many 
enemies. Upon having received no support from the UN or the US despite them each 
having knowledge of Iraqi forces using chemical weapons on Iranian civilians and after 
suffering the loss of Iran Air flight 655, the Ayatollah accepted a ceasefire in 1988 and 
described this concession as having drank “a chalice of poison”.85 In the days after 
Khomeini’s death, Iranian society had undergone yet another transformation in which the 
role of the IRGC came into question. Soleimani returned to his home province of Kerman 
where he reconnected with his roots in tribal culture with members of the IRGC to police 
the areas that had been polluted with drug lords, bandits, and outlaws.86 It was through 
this endeavor of regional pacification that Soleimani carved himself an enduring role in 
repairing post-war Iran. Not only did he protect the nation from internal and external 
threats, but he applied several of Machiavelli’s defensive concepts in using his prior 
knowledge of tribal societies and local geography87 to negotiate regional peace with tribal 
communities as well as improve these areas with the promotion of agriculture88, an effort 
that did not go unnoticed by President Rafsanjani, with whom Soleimani would come to 
forge a lasting bond. In 1992 Soleimani solidified his religious codification by taking the 
holy pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and in 1998, Hajj Qassem Soleimani was named 
the commander of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Quds Force and would “turn the nondescript 
force into the most ambitious expeditionary army in the history of the Middle East”.89 
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Soleimani’s influence spread through the years90 to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, 
and Afghanistan, uniting an integrated transnational army under largely sectarian Shia 
sensibilities and common purpose.91 He forged lasting connections with regional leaders 
through his knowledge of historic cultural ties and avoided rash decisions based on 
Quranic whims and instead became known for his calm use of strategic patience.92 By the 
time Soleimani had entered what would become the final decade of his life, he had 
established a legacy of protecting national interests whilst simultaneously advancing 
Iranian pursuits across the Middle East despite considerable and nearly constant 
opposition on multiple fronts. Having become the hub of anti-Zionist sentiments by 
201193, the Iranian footprint came to be recognized globally for its brutal efficacy and its 
leaders for their capability to preserve the narrative of protection for Islamists everywhere 
from oppressive dictatorships. By 2013 global debate over the threatening status of Iran’s 
nuclear program and its bitter feud with Israeli leadership took center stage in global 
political discussion.94 Soleimani’s role over the following 7 years would encapsulate the 
pinnacle of his power and craft for him a widely recognized reputation of greatness and 
talent, an essential element of Machiavelli’s recommendations for princes to be held in 
high esteem.95 
The rise of ISIS in Syria created a unique opportunity for the Islamist regime to 
expand its power and influence win the region. Soleimani’s Quds force dedicated itself to 
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combatting advances from the Islamic State and Iran established several unlikely 
coalitions not just with the United States and Iraqi militias, but also with Kurdish forces 
who had an open alliance with Iran’s sworn nemesis; Israel.96 “Soleimani’s rushing to the 
scene brought him praise at home and abroad. […] Many young people in Iran who 
would have never gone anywhere near an IRGC figure now loved to share the heroic 
images of his presence in the battleground”.97 However, this seemingly robust joint 
venture was not to last as Iranian leaders rallied the Shia from Iran, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq to defend one of the world’s most hated dictators: Bashar Al-
Assad.98 The Syrian conflict in conjunction with growing concern surrounding Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions and ballistic missile capabilities ushered in the end of cooperation 
between Iran and the United States. Despite the ratification of the JCPOA in 2015, 
Iranian friction with American forces and regional99 enemies in the Middle East only 
grew and by 2017, the Trump Administration and Soleimani himself traded political 
blows via social media and through proxy conflicts within the territory.100 The Israeli 
threat101, in tandem with President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign was unleashed 
in 2019 and the Quds Force, under Soleimani’s command, continued its pursuit of 
regional expansion and exerted defiant, aggressive responses to these assaults, namely the 
asymmetrical warfare used to attack oil installations in Saudi Arabia.102  
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Although the feud between Donald Trump and Qassem Soleimani escalated 
throughout 2019 and was undoubtedly the inspiration behind the decision for the 
general’s assassination, it was clear that Soleimani did not believe his work in Iran would 
come to such an abrupt end. In his final months, the famed general took a more active 
role in engaging in social media and addressing ongoing cultural issues such as defending 
women who chose not to don a hijab and lending personal assistance in Khuzestan after 
local authorities had failed to effectively respond to a flood in the area.103 He even 
considered for the first time positioning himself for a future in government, going so far 
as to have his men investigate the possibility of his candidacy for president in 2021.104 
However, events spiraled out of control in December of 2019 as the US and Iran traded 
strikes against one another105 in a variety of forms. Soleimani’s refusal to cease his 
aggressive stratagems against the United States was repaid by January 3, 2020, with the 
fateful drone strike that ended his life. Millions took to the streets across the Middle East, 
some in misery and others in celebration, but one thing was certain; Soleimani’s 
assassination came in an unprecedented fashion and this event would scar the Iranian 
nation for years to come. 
At the beginning of his life, Soleimani’s choices were somewhat consistent with 
the characteristics of the timocratic man. Born under lesser circumstances and desiring to 
surpass the accomplishments of his father, Soleimani sought out physical demonstrations 
of greatness early on and gleaned respect from activities such as karate and wrestling 
 
103 Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 249. 
104 Ibid. Azizi. Pg. 250. 
105 Makhura B. Rapanyane., Shai, Kgothatso B. 2020. "The Dynamics of Seven Days of "War of Words" 
and its implications on USA- Iran Relations." Gender & Behavior (University of Limpopo: Department of 





before transitioning to a militant career. In his adult life, he encouraged the cultivation of 
agriculture to the remote tribal regions he became familiar with in his youth, promoting a 
community-minded improvement for the better of the nation. In his final months, he took 
more of an open interest in political issues and began to engage in broader discussions of 
cultural change. However, the majority of Soleimani’s life was ultimately defined more 
by Machiavellian concepts than Platonic. A student of warfare from the moment he took 
an interest in karate, his military career occupied the lion’s share of his life and within it 
he displayed a willingness to manipulate and alter the fabric of his reality to accomplish 
his wartime objectives. Soleimani’s intricate knowledge of regional geography aided him 
in not only defending Iranian territory but also in planning offensives in neighboring 
regions to wage proxy warfare. His life was consumed by combat on all fronts and 
though his mind turned toward politics in his final days, his assassination leaves nothing 
but unanswered questions regarding what form his political career might have taken.  
Turkish Political Development 
 The modern Turkish state is marred by violence and political unrest under the 
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan106 whose reform of Turkish society signifies a 
significant departure from the secular principles that had been established by Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk.107 However, despite this current political reversion, Turkey’s Ottoman 
and Byzantine108 roots still underpin the broader societal norms of Turkish society to this 
day. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire is a centuries-long era of conflict and 
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exploration; threatened by Mongol invaders in the early 1200’s, warring with Iran in the 
1500’s, Italy in the 1600’s, Russia and Austria in the 1700’s, and so on, experiencing 
constant shifts in political culture in the face of the declining global influence and 
domestic efficacy of its Sultans.109 Efforts to reform the failing Ottoman Empire and 
adapt to increasing levels of international business culminated in 1845110 as Tanzimat was 
initiated. Tanzimat was a major indicator of growing societal acceptance of several 
western values111 in adherence with modern concepts of economy and trade, however, not 
all elements of modernization were cohesive with the laws and preferences of the 
Ottoman Sultans, thus the empire continued its slope of economic decline and stagnant 
societal progress until the final days of the languishing empire. The Ottoman Empire and 
its growing collection of inadequacies in dealing with wealth disparities and social issues, 
grew oppressive in its surveillance112 of the populace, and corrupt in its legal structure. 
Not only did the Sultan Abdulhamit II attempt to suffocate intellectual material 
discussing freedom and independent activity, but he employed the use of brutal policing 
to punish all those accused of undermining autocratic rule.113 These behaviors gave birth 
to the beginnings of revolution and the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire. With 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at the helm at the close of the first world war, the following era 
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would come to be recounted as one of the most prosperous in Turkish history114, and 
Ataturk’s reforms lifted the Turkish nation from the ashes of the Ottoman collapse. 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
 The impact of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s devotedness to the reformation of the 
Turkish state remains a key element of modern Turkish identity. In 1923115, Ataturk 
founded the Republic of Turkey, and his presidency is marked as a period of major 
societal reform and modernization that launched Turkey into a new era of prosperity. 
During his time as the leader of the Turkish republic, Ataturk re-designed the political 
and legal system, revitalized the economy116, secularized both government and education 
in abolishing the caliphate, granted equal rights to women, altered the alphabet as well as 
traditional attire requirements, and finally, advanced the cultivation of wisdom from the 
arts, sciences, industry, and agriculture.117 Ataturk had long believed himself to be the 
savior118 of the Turkish state and he was determined from an exceedingly young age to 
see this conviction come to fruition. These fundamental alterations to Turkish civilization 
helped to create a thriving, forward-thinking society in the generations to come that 
signified a significant departure from the failings of the Ottoman Empire that preceded it. 
He passed away in 1938 after only 15 years of ruling, but it is still remarked that though 
he was born an Ottoman, he died a Turk. However, his rise to political power was 
supported by his extensive military career and impressive contributions on Turkey’s 
behalf during the first world war. His battlefield successes coupled with a keen knack for 
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military strategy launched Ataturk onto a path of militant legacy, and his early fascination 
with political and social issues guided his career toward meaningful political engagement. 
Indeed, though Ataturk’s pre-political career was largely militant, his motivations were 
underpinned by a constant desire to forge opportunities for the intellectual growth and 
liberation of Turkish society. A timocratic figure from the outset, Ataturk exhibited a 
superlative sense of Platonic, state-minded ambition and would go on to reshape the 
Ottoman Empire with this principle in mind. 
The Ottoman Empire that preceded the new Turkish republic was known as the 
sick man of Europe; a decaying society in which the disparity between the rich and poor 
only grew119 as the Islamic theology that directed the finer points of Ottoman identity 
simultaneously stunted Turkey’s ability to embrace modern advancements. Ataturk was 
born into a police state controlled autocratically by the Sultan and Caliph following an 
unsuccessful attempt at establishing a constitutional democracy in the late 1800’s. He 
grew up observing corruption and despotism and despised the public regression that 
tyrannical headship and archaic religious principles had created. His father, Ali Riza, was 
certainly no stranger to the difficulties of attempting business ventures in the fragmented 
chaos under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamit II.120 Indeed, he died at the early age of 47 
after continually failing to succeed in his commercial schemes, branded a failure in the 
eyes of his grief-stricken family that had already been afflicted with the loss of several 
children.121 Ataturk, a young boy at the time pursued an education in the civil service 
through the military academy of Salonica122, a major Turkish port city known widely for 
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its multiethnic structure and diversity.  “Military education reinforced in him an already 
masterful disposition. As the only surviving male in a fatherless household Ataturk was 
the most important person at home”123 and was further determined to avoid the failures of 
his late father. This attitude of somewhat inherent superiority only grew as he excelled in 
his prep school studies and quickly developed skills in writing124 and making public 
addresses. This dexterity was also evident in his singular command of religious rhetoric, 
instilled in him through years of religious instruction and practice.125 In his transition to 
the War College in Istanbul in 1899126, his interest in literature and the works of banned 
philosophers127 became a major aspect of his political foundations. He engaged with the 
works of Rousseau and Voltaire in an effort to better understand the issues facing the 
Ottoman society and found the arguments unsatisfactory. Although he was determined to 
eventually find better solutions to the nation’s plight than those posited by modern 
political philosophers, his primary focus was on his military career.128 Ataturk’s path 
toward leadership exhibited incredible command of strategic military tactics129, a study 
which was continually pursued throughout his lifetime. Ataturk’s vast collection of 
impressive battlefield victories served as the major conduit through which he was 
ultimately able to ascend to a position of political power. However, his engagement with 
political philosophy in his early education birthed within him a steadfast determination to 
apply his intellect and mastery of strategy toward the betterment of the Turkish nation 
and the enlightenment of its constituents.    
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In observance of the corruption and incompetent handling of the Ottoman military 
at the hand of the Shah, “Mustafa Kemal combined political agitation with concentration 
of his military studies. He was fashioning himself into a politically aware and politically 
ambitious professional soldier”.130 Ataturk entered the war college in 1899131 in Istanbul, 
the heart of the Ottoman Empire. There he witnessed Turkish citizens being forced to live 
like prisoners, lowly in the eyes of rich despots and foreigners that sought to take 
advantage of the frail societal structure. Social mobility was extremely limited, and 
people often betrayed or even preyed upon one another to gain a lucrative position. 
Conditions at the Imperial War College were similarly depraved due to a lack of 
infrastructural foundations and a restricting network of the Sultan’s spies and edicts.132 
Ataturk soon made friends who had high-ranking fathers, allowing him access to useful 
connections which helped propel him into the political sphere later in his life.133 These 
friendships provided him with opportunities to foster a greater appreciation of 
independent activity and a loathing for the dictatorial chokehold of the Sultan’s policies 
and military restrictions.134 “Mustafa Kemal believed that Abdulhamit’s fear of military 
maneuvers and his refusal to allow the use of live ammunition in training exercises had 
left the Ottoman armed forces unprepared for modern war. When the ban on the use of 
live ammunition was lifted during Mustafa Kemal’s service in Syria, he is said to have 
compiled a firing manual from such Turkish language sources as he could find”.135 In 
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fact, he regularly engaged in legally prohibited activities such as drinking in public136 
whilst being a soldier and secretly publishing multiple political papers137 detailing the 
issues within the Ottoman Empire and openly criticizing the Shah’s governance. His 
publishing activities resulted in his arrest138 at the age of 24 and he was exiled to 
Damascus for three years where he was able to observe firsthand the damages created by 
despotism and corruption139 in an environment of extreme militancy. Ataturk’s 
dissatisfaction with the existing political order undoubtedly encouraged much of his 
defiant behavior, but his attempts to broach the subject of political reform in the hopes 
that his work might benefit and enlighten the broader society is an example of the 
Platonic principles that inspired him throughout his pre-political life. 
Ataturk’s political thinking remained central to his engagement with his military 
career. He sought to foster a more comprehensive sense of the effective uses of military 
strength and inspire an ethos revolving around politically radical concepts at the time. 
“Mustafa Kemal was passionately interested in the art of war […] and he believed that 
the safety of the fatherland and the happiness of the nation require[d] above all that the 
world should be shown that [the Ottoman army was] still the same army that had planted 
its lance in the walls of Vienna”.140 He decided to form a secret society prioritizing 
freedom and idealizing the concept of the militant strength to be found in the fatherland, 
but in 1908 another secret society that had been formed rose to the forefront and his own 
committee became peripheral. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)141 pressured 
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the Sultan to restore the former constitution142 of Turkey which had been dismissed some 
30 years prior. However, despite the reformative efforts of what would become the 
Young Turk Revolution, many of the problems facing the nation remained. Ataturk, still 
concentrating on military matters and the collection of intelligence143, insisted that 
measures should be taken to create a more defensible structure for the empire. “Mustafa 
Kemal was suspicious of the Bulgarians. […] Mustafa Kemal warned that the Bulgarians 
still hoped to regain Edirne. He argued that the Ottomans should respond by giving their 
officers better training, and by instilling in them a spirit of initiative and the desire to take 
the offensive”.144 His ideas were originally criticized heavily by other members of the 
committee resulting in Ataturk’s separation from the CUP.145 Whilst governmental 
control reverted to a dictatorial oligarchy for a time, his moment to shine arrived at last 
with the onset of the first world war.  
Having received a thorough militant education in the Ottoman Military College, 
Ataturk’s keen use of martial strategy aided him in liberating two provinces in Turkey 
and doling out a historically devastating defeat to British forces at the battle of Gallipoli 
in 1915146 which facilitated his emergence from WWI as the sole Ottoman Commander 
to have never suffered a defeat on the battlefield.147 Superiors recalled that, “Mustafa 
Kemal […] was a commander willing to take on duties and responsibilities. On 25 April 
he used his own initiative to join the battle with his 19th division and push the enemy 
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back to the beaches. Then for three months he put up and indomitable resistance against 
constant violent attacks. I was thus able to place total trust in his energy and 
determination”.148 Ataturk’s experience in the territories of the Balkan Wars granted him 
a unique perspective149 concerning at which locations the Allied forces were most likely 
to make advances in the peninsula and he used this geographical expertise to take an 
active role in formulating defensive strategies and attempting to prevent major losses 
throughout the duration of the war. His mettle as a military commander was tested again 
four years later as he successfully led his forces against an invasion from the Greek army 
and subsequently won back Turkish independence150 in 1919 which defied the existing 
Sultan’s government and established the basis for the new national effort under Ataturk’s 
leadership. A proven military expert and a master in matters of diplomacy151, by the end 
of the war Ataturk had been given command of eleven separate divisions as well as a 
cavalry brigade.152 Ataturk’s militant skills were undoubtedly the result of his extensive 
and continual study of military matters and his tactical use of geographic opportunities 
throughout the region is an ode to a Machiavelli’s prioritization of the mastery of battle 
strategy. To this end, although his actions were primarily derived from state-minded 
political aspirations, Ataturk demonstrates the ways in which even the timocratic man can 
channel Machiavelli’s principles of expert militancy. 
Ataturk is one of the most revered military tacticians in Turkish history. He had 
led several major offensives in-person153 with his soldiers by his side and is remembered 
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as “the outstanding front-line commander in the northern sector. […] Mustafa Kemal was 
not alone the savior of Istanbul, but he made a notable contribution to the defense of the 
capital. He displayed personal courage and inspired his men who were fighting in 
appalling conditions. Although his ambition [made] him a difficult man to work with, 
[…] his ability was never in doubt”.154 Following the cessation of the great war in 1918, 
Ataturk’s attention was devoted to the preservation of the few Turkish assets that were 
still in the hands of the Turkish nation: the populace, the land, and a military force 
capable of defending them.155 This was the driving motivation that he carried into his 
transition to political life. Ataturk had proven time and again his nationalistic dedication 
to defending the Turkish nation, but he made a concerted effort to establish the 
importance of the tactful employment of armed forces in order to regain a sense of 
national pride and to effectively defend the changes promised in a revolutionized society. 
His goals came to fruition in 1920 as he was elected to the Presidency of the Grand 
National Assembly and the days of the old Ottoman Empire came to a long-awaited 
end.156 By 1922 the armistice after a long war had been signed and by 1923 the Lausanne 
Treaty157 was ratified by several European powers. Turkey entered a new age of growth 
and prosperity and with Kemal’s unanimous election to the presidency of the newly 
proclaimed republic, the nation evolved to such a degree that Ataturk retains his title, “the 
Father of the Turks”, to this day.  
Ataturk came into the world under the strain of ineffectual governance and the 
subsequent suffering of his family. Desiring to supersede the accomplishments of his 
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father, Ataturk’s timocratic nature prevailed in encouraging his embrace of military 
education. His early fascination with the works of political philosophers coupled with his 
dissatisfaction of the governance in the Ottoman Empire inspired Ataturk to not only 
develop a strong political foundation, but to wield it in the service of the Turkish 
constituency. Militant though his pre-political career was, Ataturk’s major goals of a 
cultural overhaul underpinned every decision that he made in achieving military 
greatness. Although Machiavelli’s militant prince bears some similarities to Plato’s 
martial timocratic leader, the key distinction elevating Ataturk’s relative success is the 
consistency with which he displayed state-minded ambition in the hopes of promoting 
widespread enlightenment and cultural liberation. From his publishing activities to his 
suggestions for military reform, Ataturk’s hopes for the nation promoted the long-term 
salvation of the historically oppressed Turkish state. His engagement with Platonic 
notions represents a compounding of state-minded, reason guided thinking that begets 







Upon analyzing the biographies of Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, it becomes palpable that both men were largely personifications of the timocratic 
man and resolute students of warfare for the length of their pre-political vocations. 
However, in developing divergent ethos with regards to their personal ambitions, 
Ataturk’s early and consistent engagement with political issues left him better equipped 
to broach the political sphere than Soleimani. Indeed, Soleimani’s inexperience in 
engaging in global political discussion due to his prioritization of militant matters above 
all else left him vulnerable and unprepared for a future in politics. The philosophies of 
political theorists like Plato and Machiavelli help to generate the paradigms by which 
political actions can be evaluated and explained. The examination of Qassem Soleimani 
and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a comparative case study lends itself to the basic 
foundational elements of political theory that promotes the elevation of existing research 
in the field.  
This assessment has exposed multiple distinct parallels between the lifestyles and 
behaviors of these historic figures whilst simultaneously bridging theoretical components 
from two very different theorists. In addressing the research question concerning the 
relative efficacy of Ataturk as opposed to Soleimani regarding their methods of 
Machiavellian and Platonic activities, it is my contention that Ataturk was a more 
effective leader than Soleimani in his pre-political career directly due to his prioritization 
of long-term, state-minded reform. Although the pre-political careers of both Ataturk and 
Soleimani were similar in origin, militant distinction, and charismatic styles of authority, 





Soleimani’s priority for much of his life was simply maintaining a high-profile military 
career, Ataturk used the Ottoman Army from the beginning as a conduit for his goals of 
ascending to political office and reshaping the Turkish nation for the better and was thus 
a more complete fulfillment of Platonic leadership concepts. Consequently, Soleimani’s 
leadership style is more consistent with the tenets of Machiavelli’s prescriptions for 
leadership. Furthermore, in applying the nuances of the theories of Plato and Machiavelli 
as frameworks for evaluating political conduct, the inherent definitional discrepancies of 
the concept of ambition generates opposing behavioral directives. While Plato’s version 
of headship re-orients individual ambition to incorporate state-minded altruism, 
Machiavelli’s advocates for the internalization of ambition to such an extent that it 
engenders an excessively defensive mentality, impeding the leader’s capacity to 
acclimate to the complexities of the shifting political world. 
As for the more specific theoretical components, one of Plato’s overt desires in 
writing The Republic was to promote an environment more conducive to the pursuit of 
knowledge and the cultivation of reason as a central governing agent in civil societies. 
However, even partial exhibitions of Platonic principles through the pursuit of state-
minded reform have the potential to ease the process through which military figures 
ascend to positions of political influence and achieve success in their pre-political 
careers. Both Qassem Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk grew up during times of 
major political and governmental instability and therefore possess several qualities 
reflective of Plato’s timocratic man. While Soleimani witnessed the hardships of his 
father due to the ineffective land reforms of the Iranian Shah, Ataturk observed gross 





the Turkish nation as well as his own father. Both men developed a keen interest in 
martial strategy, recognizing that military figures were widely revered as both heroic and 
honorable. Soleimani became heavily involved in Iranian martial arts and Mustafa Kemal 
pursued a thorough education in multiple military academies before both formally began 
their military careers. For Soleimani and Ataturk, military career paths served as 
opportunities to not only garner respect in otherwise restrictive societies but also 
provided a chance for them to play a part in the ongoing societal changes that were 
occurring. Soleimani wished to become involved in the new Iranian culture that was 
forming after the 1979 revolution and applied his natural skills with such success that he 
quickly rose through the ranks of the Iranian military and would ultimately train one of 
the most highly effective military outfits in the Middle East. Ataturk, being highly 
dissatisfied with existing philosophy on effective governance, sought to one day affect 
meaningful changes of his own and used his extraordinary strategic skill to prove his 
worth in the first world war and continue defending the Turkish state against its enemies 
with fierce efficiency for years to come. Both men reveled in their military successes and 
took pride in the respect of their fellow countrymen. Neither would have achieved such 
success had they not applied their natural senses of ambition and their desires to live a 
more prosperous life that that of their fathers.  
However, while Plato’s model of the timocratic man bears several characteristics 
that are reminiscent of his concept of the philosopher king, it remains a far cry from 
Plato’s preferences for ideal leadership. The timocratic model is described as a product of 
the decline of the ideal state and is not as highly engaged in philosophy and yet he is not 





elements of reason and altruism.158 Plato’s ideal manner of leadership prizes forms of 
ambition that take the shape of selfless, state-minded improvement and further 
encourages the dissemination of truth wherever possible. To this end Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk is a more cohesive fit with Plato’s description of the timocratic man than Qassem 
Soleimani. Soleimani’s life is more consistently aligned with Machiavellian concepts and 
the behaviors associated with Machiavelli’s princes are categorically classified as an 
inferior style of leadership to that of the timocratic man. Hence, although the timocratic 
model is not the ideal in Plato’s eyes, it would still maintain a higher status than a 
Machiavellian prince. While Soleimani’s militant career was certainly derived to some 
extent from his timocratic roots, his engagement in his adult life with religious 
manipulation and deceit in his world of everlasting warfare makes him more 
appropriately suited to Machiavelli’s ideals than Plato’s. The militant timocratic figure 
that Plato describes is perhaps not the perfectly balanced philosophe that he so admires, 
but it does provide a practical template from which analytical conclusions about militant 
figures in history can be made in conjunction with other philosophers specializing in 
militant efficiency. While Ataturk’s military career illuminated his skills in martial 
strategy and his dedication to the study of warfare, his political motivations for the 
purpose of elevating the collective consciousness of the Turkish nation more 
appropriately characterize him as a timocratic figure, exuding Platonic ideals. 
Finally, the details provided in the biographies of Soleimani and Ataturk, are sure 
indications that both figures undoubtedly excelled in the realm of military study which 
was so essential in the eyes of Machiavelli. However, to his peril, Qassem Soleimani was 
 





a more complete embodiment of Machiavelli’s leadership principles than Ataturk in a 
variety of ways. One of this philosopher’s primary intentions in publishing The Prince 
was to ensure that leaders maintained a high level of domestic control such that a prince’s 
reign would never be threatened by the potential of revolution.159 As such, internal 
stability combined with rigid military excellence was meant to defend the realm from any 
outside threats no matter the number of international rivalries.160 However, there exists 
within Machiavelli’s studious soldier framework an inherent mechanism for maintaining 
a constantly proactive, defensive mindset. While this principle is undoubtedly a major 
contributor to battlefield success and the maintenance of the territories one is charged 
with defending, the vigilant sense of awareness and suspicion that Machiavelli requests 
creates a sense of obsession that has the potential to overrule peripheral ambitions. The 
psychological demand placed on Machiavelli’s ideal prince figure to maintain a relentless 
state of primed consciousness concerning potential threats could be a major contributor to 
the divide between military and political careers. Soleimani’s prevalence as a prominent 
leader was directly intertwined with his ability to defend the Iranian nation and its 
soldiers to such an extent that this mission dominated his life’s ambitions and contributed 
to his arrogant and abrasive approach to political discourse. Nevertheless, Soleimani 
suffered an abrupt death as a direct result of his heavily militant attitudes when faced 
with political engagement, leaving chaos in his wake.161  
Although both Soleimani and Ataturk each proved their commitment to the 
cultivation of military knowledge beyond a shadow of a doubt, Machiavelli’s strategic 
 
159 Ibid. Ricci. Pg. 66-71.  
160 Ibid. Ricci. Pg. 67.  





principles as a whole entail more than a simple engagement with military matters. They 
advocate for social manipulation where necessary and promote the use of personal 
ambition to achieve individual power more so than to provide society-wide 
enlightenment. While Ataturk exhibited martial skill and ceaseless military study, 
Soleimani’s entire life was defined by his military career and his brutal, Machiavellian 
leadership style. Soleimani was willing to apply some of the more duplicitous 
recommendations of Machiavelli’s prescriptions through his frequent manipulation of 
religious rhetoric as well as in his careful crafting of his international and domestic 
reputation. He sought above all to be respected and loved by his soldiers and gravely 
feared by his enemies and subsequently went to great lengths to accomplish this. 
However, Machiavellian as he may have been, Soleimani’s final months were 
characterized by his abject failure to engage in peaceful international discourse with 
foreign powers as he turned his eye toward politics. This shortcoming has been argued by 
some to be a result of his overwhelming hubris stemming from his extensive battlefield 
experience and routine dealings in the realm of conflict itself.162 Indeed, it is widely 
claimed that Soleimani “allowed his ego to overcome his judgment”.163 Defensive and 
bold, Soleimani increasingly spoke in a threatening fashion and his “progressively 
boastful rhetoric”164 in his dealings with President Trump demonstrated a fundamental 
lack of diplomatic tact that would come to play a major role in his ultimate demise. 
However, it is my contention that this failure is indicative of Soleimani’s broader lack of 
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engagement with Platonic principles, and his obsessive Machiavellian approach to 
addressing conflict on and off the battlefield. 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani both exhibited, at least partially, 
qualities valued by both Plato and Machiavelli in their conceptions of ideal leadership, 
but the value of assessing the degree to which these men fulfill each philosopher’s 
standards is indispensable in elucidating the significance of these concepts as they apply 
to modern evaluations of leadership. This research addresses what it truly means for an 
action to be classified as Machiavellian and demonstrates examples of how this behavior 
manifests amongst modern leaders such as Qassem Soleimani. Although Ataturk was 
similarly militant in his pre-political career, his actions even on the battlefield were 
constantly guided by his deep-seated aspirations to rise to a position of political influence 
and alter the displeasing conditions which he observed within the Ottoman empire. The 
examination of the distinction between the militant prince and the timocratic man 
identifies the key elements distinguishing leaders like Mustafa Kemal Ataturk from other 
prominent martial leaders in history. Ataturk’s early-prioritization of state-minded 
motivation, an attribute that even Plato finds essential in a leader, is very likely to have 
majorly eased his journey toward a career in politics. To this end, it can be argued that 
pure, unfiltered exhibitions of Machiavelli’s leadership principles cannot secure long-
term invincibility to international threats against one’s sovereignty. Indeed, such 
behaviors, if not tempered with certain Platonic concepts to enhance societal progress can 







 Upon reflection of the information gathered throughout the course of this study, it 
can be conceivably argued that a key determinant in the differing fates of Qassem 
Soleimani and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was the theoretical ethos by which each man lived 
his life. While Ataturk was guided by principles of a more altruistic, Platonic nature, 
Soleimani’s inherent Machiavellian mentality drove his career toward a less desirable 
end. In the context of existing applications of political theory in the interpretation of 
political actions, this study provides a comparative analysis that not only engages with 
the nuances of the detailed characteristics described by Plato and Machiavelli but goes a 
step further in connecting these profiles to explain psychologically based behaviors that 
are derived from these frameworks. Plato’s conceptualization of the timocratic man 
presents realistic and observable traits that can be applied to both Soleimani and Ataturk 
as militant figures whose origins served as inspiration to surpass the accomplishments of 
their fathers before them. The total entrenchment of Soleimani and Ataturk in devoted 
and ceaseless study of military strategy both in their careers as well as their lifestyles is a 
clear ode to Machiavelli’s recommendations. While Qassem Soleimani maintained 
singularly militant aspirations in his pre-political career, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
possessed long-term political goals that underpinned every aspect of his military career, 
demonstrating the continued value of Platonic principles in observed political behavior. 
Thus, while Soleimani’s accomplishments in combat secured him a place in history, the 
inherency of Machiavelli’s defensive stratagems and the hubris that often accompanies a 
militant lifestyle drove him toward dangerous conflicts on the international stage and 





 Future research relating to this subject could examine several areas of inquiry left 
unanswered through the course of this study. In drawing comparisons between the 
Turkish and Iranian societies at these points in history, both reveal themselves to be 
revolutionary societies with repressive elements. However, as Turkey was a secular 
community and Iran, theocratic, it must be asked whether cross examinations of political 
behaviors stemming from such dissimilar civilizations broadens or limits the capacity for 
political theories to be effective metrics for examination. Furthermore, given the 
fluctuations in political and cultural standards in both nations in the modern day, there 
exists an opportunity to evaluate not only the scale of the improvements men like Ataturk 
have contributed to their societies, but also the relative effectiveness or lack thereof if 
these alterations fade over time. For instance, does the current reversion of secular values 
in modern Turkey indicate a sense of failure by Ataturk himself or simply represent the 
natural evolution of cultural norms in the face of a changing political world? 
Furthermore, Ataturk’s leadership behaviors, though found in this study to be more 
consistent with Platonic values, also reveal certain departures from Plato’s ideal standards 
in the inherent flaws associated with the timocratic man. Having been raised under 
economic strain due to the failures of his father, the timocratic man is noted to be stingy 
with money165 and acquire his wealth with a certain degree of secrecy. Given the 
knowledge that in Ataturk’s later political career he was known to conceal his wealth166, 
this might indicate a difficulty in claiming that most of his political aspirations were 
based in Platonic altruism and selfless motivation. Further research might inquire whether 
 
165 Ibid. Bloom. Pg. 225 
166 Ozyurek, Esra. 2004. "Miniaturizing Ataturk: Privatization of State Imagery and Ideology in Turkey." 





Ataturk’s late political ambitions stayed true to his originally altruistic ambitions or if 
these goals were distorted by the lure of wealth that he had been deprived of in his youth. 
Another area of inquiry lies in a discussion of the circumstances of Qassem 
Soleimani’s death. The unprecedented nature of the targeted killing was undoubtedly a 
shock to the international community, but inquiries could be made concerning whether 
Soleimani’s mercurial behavior in response to American aggressions truly triggered dire 
concerns warranting his assassination, or whether he was simply the victim of a historic 
political blunder. It might also be a useful examination of the relationships depicted in 
Machiavelli’s writing concerning rulers and those who serve them. Soleimani was used 
for the purpose of this research to examine own leadership behaviors, however, as a close 
personal agent of Ayatollah Khomeini, Soleimani was regularly deployed to exact brutal 
and violent retaliation upon the enemies of the Ayatollah and the state. This hearkens 
back to the example of Machiavelli’s archetype, Cesare Borgia and his exploitative 
relationship with Messer Remiro d’ Orco167, prompting questions as to whether or not 
this relationship would be a more effective example in which to showcase Machiavellian 
principles regarding the protection and management of one’s own reputation. Regardless, 
the lives of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Qassem Soleimani are exceedingly thought-
provoking examples of the many ways that militant figures can change the world and 
contribute to modern political research in expanding the application of political 
philosophy to contemporary archetypes. 
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